Security context

What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.

immunefi-team/audit-comp-quantus-qp-rusty-crystals

              audit-comp-ready @ 94dfe6e
            

Fixes

CVEs

HIGH

Peak severity

42.9%

Coverage

Highlights

Cryptographic Signature Forgery: 2 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.

dilithium/src/ml_dsa_87.rs: most-fixed (2 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.

5 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.

Recurring patterns

The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.

Cryptographic Signature Forgery: All-zero t1 public keys were accepted on multiple key import/verification paths, allowing signature forgery without a secret key. Fixes in two commits reject this degenerate key in public_key_from_secret, PublicKey::from_bytes, and sign::verify, but other import paths may still miss the check.

Timing Side-Channel (Secret-Dependent Branch/Division): Multiple secret-dependent divisions and branches in Dilithium signing (rej_eta, check_norm, make_hint, pack_sig) could leak key material via timing. The fix replaced them with constant-time operations, but similar patterns may exist in other signing/verification functions.

Auth Bypass: ResharingCertificate::verify accepted empty/truncated participant lists, letting unsigned certificates pass. The fix binds the committee into the hash and requires exact key map match, but other certificate verification paths may still be lax.