Security context
What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.
finos/git-proxy
main @ 3186da2
89
Fixes
0
CVEs
CRITICAL
Peak severity
37.8%
Coverage
Highlights
Auth Bypass: 30 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
src/proxy/processors/push-action/parsePush.ts: most-fixed (10 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
48 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Command Injection: The proxy historically spawned shell processes using `spawnSync` with unvalidated arguments, exposing the application to argument and command injections during remote clone operations. Migrating to programmatic APIs like `isomorphic-git` is essential.
Auth Bypass: Relying on easily spoofed git commit metadata (such as commit author headers or lightweight tag properties) allowed attackers to bypass transport-layer authorization checks. Validating authenticated identities rather than commit headers is critical.
Auth Bypass: Flawed middleware logical checks (such as skipping verification if configured methods were not explicitly disabled) allowed unauthenticated requests to flow straight to API endpoints by calling `next()`.