Security context
What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.
Universal-Commerce-Protocol/ucp
main @ 1d39948
4
Fixes
0
CVEs
HIGH
Peak severity
Highlights
Signature Verification Bypass: 2 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
docs/specification/signatures.md: most-fixed (2 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
4 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Signature Verification Bypass: Two separate fixes address the same verifier, indicating the signature check is a persistent weak point; the first adds capability-based key resolution and a covered-component gate, the second mandates @authority and ucp-agent in signed components. A bypass in either path compromises integrity of all signed requests.
Auth Bypass: The binding verification logic previously allowed authorization bypass by conflating resource binding with participant authorization; the fix separates these and requires exact equality on type/id. This is a classic confusion between what a token is bound to and who it authorizes.
Spoofing: Schema URL validation lacked authority binding, allowing spoofed capabilities; the fix rejects on mismatch. This is an input-validation gap on a trust-bearing field.