Security context
What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.
Consensys/web3signer
master @ 198c313
32
Fixes
0
CVEs
HIGH
Peak severity
80.0%
Coverage
Highlights
Dependency Vulnerability: 13 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
gradle/versions.gradle: most-fixed (16 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
17 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Auth Bypass: Two fixes added security handlers for keymanager endpoints but hardcoded authorized=true with a TODO, meaning the handler is a no-op placeholder that always authorizes. This leaves key deletion and other keymanager operations fully unauthenticated.
Auth Bypass: Host allowlist was bypassable when the Host header was empty or missing, allowing SSRF-style access to signing endpoints. The fix rejects such requests, but sibling handlers (e.g., metrics endpoint) may have the same gap.
Logic Error (Slashing Protection Bypass): Slashing protection logic lacked minimum epoch/slot checks, allowing signing of blocks/attestations below previously recorded minimums, which could lead to slashable double-signing. The fix added these checks, but the logic must be validated across all signing paths.